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Abstract In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for the impact of discipli-
nary sanctions imposed on Spanish auditing firms and their engagement partners. The
disciplinary sanctions resulted from external investigations, which revealed misappli-
cations of auditing standards. In particular, we evaluate (a) the efficacy of the external
supervisory board in identifying low-quality auditors and (b) the effectiveness of the
disciplinary system in improving the quality of subsequent statutory audits performed
by the sanctioned auditors.We employ two earningsmanagement indicators as proxies
for audit quality: loss avoidance through extraordinary items and abnormal accruals.
And we compare these measures in the financial statements of client companies (audi-
tees) audited by sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors between 1995 and 2007.
Our evidence is mixed. The results show that companies audited by Non-Big 4 sanc-
tioned auditors in the pre-inspection period are less likely to avoid bottom-line losses.
Additionally, we conclude that use of this earnings management tool decreases in
the post-investigation period for all sanctioned auditors, whether Big 4 or Non-Big 4
firms. Contrary to our expectations, the enhancement performance on this measure of
audit quality is observed only for smaller fines. The discretionary accrual approach to
earnings management does not offer significant results, however. Therefore, the con-
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clusions are not robust, and further investigation is needed. A feasible explanation for
the elusive conclusion may be based on the strong incentives for private firms to avoid
bottom-line losses for financing purposes and to manipulate earnings to minimize tax
payments.
Keywords Auditing · Quality assurance · Audit quality · Oversight · Disciplinary
systems · Inspections · Investigations · Sanctions · Earnings management ·
Discretionary accruals
JEL Classification M42 · M48
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence for the effects of the audit
investigation and disciplinary systemconducted in Spain by Instituto de Contabilidad y
Auditoría de Cuentas (Institute of Accounting andAuditing, ICAC).More specifically,
we explore (a) the efficacy in identifying low quality auditors and (b) the effectiveness
in enhancing the quality of subsequent statutory audits of the sanctioned auditors.
The Enron scandal triggered a new auditing market configuration among the big
multinational professional services firms. The ensuingArthurAndersen auditingfiasco
reduced the group of international accounting firms from the Big 5 to the Big 41 and
provided Deloitte and the merged PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) a better placement
in the multinational professional services ranking (De Fuentes et al. 2015). The Arthur
Andersen debacle resulted in stricter audit regulations in the USA, with the enactment
of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Other countries such as France and Canada followed
suit (Baker et al. 2014)—as did Spain, where the Financial Act 44/20022 included
several measures that strengthened the auditor’s independence rules. In the European
context, it is notable that approval of Directive 2006/43/EC3 repealed the former
Directive 84/253/EEC.4
The common aim of the legislative reforms was the shift from self-regulation of the
auditing profession toward a more independent framework (Baker et al. 2014; Gunny
and Zhang 2013a). In the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX 2002) fostered the
creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). This govern-
mental institution was entrusted with the external review of auditors in order to assess
the quality of their services and their compliance with the auditing rules, replacing the
1 The Big 5 accounting firms are Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst and Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and Arthur
Andersen. The Big 4 excluded Arthur Andersen, after its collapse, in 2002.
2 Ley de Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero 44/2002, de 22 de noviembre. BOE 281 de 23 de
noviembre del 2011.
3 Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits
of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC
and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC.
4 Eight Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 April 1984 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the
approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents.
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traditional peer-review process conducted by and within the auditing firms through
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) program.
In Europe, the quality assurance systems differed among the Member States
(García-Osma et al. 2014). With the aim of harmonizing statutory audit requirements,
and in the same vein as SOX 2002, Directive 2006/43/EC compelled all Member
States to implement a public independent board entrusted with ultimate responsibility
for overseeing statutory audits (art. 32 Directive 2006/43/EC). Additionally, Directive
2006/43/EC specified that Member States should ensure that there are effective sys-
tems of investigations and dissuasive penalties that would help to detect, correct, and
prevent inadequate execution of the statutory audit (art. 30 Directive 2006/43/EC).
Overall, the European regulatory reform relies significantly on the independence of
the oversight board and its disciplinary system to enhance the quality and credibility
of audit services. Therefore, the analysis of the efficacy and effectiveness of this public
oversight board is a relevant research issue.
Prior studies, developedmainly in theUSA, have largely focused on the comparison
between the self-regulated, peer-review system under the AICPA program and the
independent supervision system of the PCAOB inspectors. Hilary and Lennox (2005),
Gunny and Zhang (2013a), and Anantharaman (2012) conclude that when the auditing
firm selects the peer-review supervisor, the outcome of the supervision is less severe
than it is under the independent supervision system. The severity is similar only when
the peer reviewer is a specialist in the same sector as the supervised auditing firm.
Archival data also illustrates the efficacy of inspections in identifying low-quality
auditors. Casterella et al. (2009) show that peer-review reports are aligned with the
level of quality offered by US auditing firms. DeFond and Lennox (2011) conclude
that low-quality auditors are more likely to receive external reports comprising quality
deficiencies than high-quality auditors are. In the same vein, Gunny andZhang (2013a)
show for auditing firms inspected triennially that the disclosure of severe deficiencies
in the inspector’s report is associated with higher current abnormal accruals in the
auditee’s financial statements. These auditing firms also exhibit greater propensity to
reformulate the annual accounts.
The effectiveness of the quality controls in enhancing audit quality in the USA has
been tested by Gramling et al. (2011); they conclude that, within the sample of tri-
ennially inspected auditing firms, only those auditors receiving a PCAOB report that
included deficiencies modified their outcomes. Carcello et al. (2011) evidence a sig-
nificant reduction in abnormal accruals in the year following the PCAOB inspections,
and these results are stronger for auditees that reported positive abnormal accruals
before the quality assessment.
In our view, the literature on the efficacy and effectiveness of the disciplinary sys-
tem is still limited, calling for further research (see, e.g., DeFond 2010). As most prior
research focuses on the outcomes of the supervision of the auditing firm’s internal qual-
ity control systems (inspections), ourwork contributes to the archival data by providing
empirical evidence on the external supervision of the working papers of a particular
audit engagement (investigations). Spain offers an adequate framework for this analy-
sis, because of a tradition, started in the early 1990s, following implementation of the
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AuditAct 1988,5 of a quality assurance systembasedon the investigations—also called
technical controls. The independent inspectors report the result of their investigations
to the ICAC, which ultimately determines if the auditor has committed an infraction
(very serious, serious, or minor), and, if so, the related penalty that would ensue.
The large majority of auditees considered in this study are private, non-listed firms,
which belong to the nonfinancial sector and operate in a context of low litigation
risk (La Porta et al. 1998) and high alignment between financial and tax accounting
(Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008). Therefore, this
paper also builds on the extant literature related to the audit quality of the financial
statements of small- and medium-sized companies. De Fuentes and Sierra (2015), for
example, have documented the impact of regulatory changes in the auditing field over
audit quality. Their meta-data demonstrate that SOX 2002 triggered a significantly
higher demand for better (more specialized) auditors servicing smaller auditees. In
the Spanish context, De las Heras et al. (2012) conclude that Financial Act 44|2002
triggered higher audit quality provided by Big 4 and Non-Big 4 auditing firms, and
that financially distressed client companies exhibited greater earnings management
constraint. Moreover, this additional effort of the statutory auditor when facing the
supervision of a small- ormedium-sized auditeewith higher business risk is discounted
in the fees of the auditing firm (Serrano Madrid et al. 2012). Aguiar-Díaz and Díaz-
Díaz (2015) identify differences in auditor behavior that are linked to client size: Big
4 and Second-Tier firms provide higher audit quality when they audit large client
companies, whereas Second-Tier firms provide lower audit quality for their smaller
clients. Huguet and Gandía (2014) also demonstrate that those smaller auditees that
avoid the audit requirements face higher costs of debt than do client companies that
undergo a compulsory audit. Additionally, voluntary audits have no effect on the cost of
the debt. Moreover, for family-owned private companies, Corten et al. (2015) suggest
that reviews and compilations seem to be sufficient and more cost effective.
In this study we examine the relationship between (a) investigations that identify
serious or very serious infractions in the audit process of a particular engagement
and b) more generalized misconduct on part of the auditors. We further explore these
investigations, asking two related questions: Do they modify the quality of subse-
quent audits and/or is any change that occurs in auditor’s behavior related to the type
of penalties imposed.
Our sample consists of annual accounts with the fiscal year included in the period
1995 to 2007, when the application of the new General Accounting Plan6 that
adapted the International Financial Reporting Standards and triggered major account-
ing changes (Gonzalo Angulo 2014) took place.
Our study is predicated on the notion that audit quality is not directly observable. As
in prior literature (see, e.g., Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Beatty et al. 2002;
Krishnan 2003;ArnedoAjona et al. 2008; Cano 2010; Carmona andMomparler 2011),
we explore audit quality differentiation through the auditor’s permissiveness toward
earnings management—specifically, loss avoidance through extraordinary items and
5 Ley 19/1988, de 12 de julio, de Auditoria de Cuentas.
6 Plan General de Contabilidad, approved through RD 1514/2007 of 16 November, 2007.
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the discretionary component of accruals in the financial statements supervised by
sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors.
The results stemming from the pre-sanction period show that only clients of Non-
Big 4 sanctioned auditors exhibit significantly higher likelihood of avoiding reporting
negative bottom-line earnings. On the other hand, the evidence provided through the
discretionary accrual analysis is weak and inconclusive.
To address our second empirical issue, we restrict the sample to clients of sanc-
tioned auditors and compute our earnings-quality measure before and after the start
of the inspections that led to an ex-post sanction. We demonstrate that the earnings
management tool—the avoidance of reporting bottom-line losses through extraordi-
nary items—is significantly mitigated in the post-investigation period. Once more, the
discretionary accruals approach to audit quality does not offer significant results. We
fail to find any difference between the behavior of Big 4 and Non-Big 4 auditors and,
contrary to expectations, our data show thatLow sanctions seem to be more effective
than High sanctions in modifying auditor’s behavior.
A feasible explanation for those findings rests on the strong incentives for private
auditees to avoid bottom-line losses (Gallén and Giner 2005) when borrowing from
banks (Cano 2007), in order to mitigate the negative economic consequences of a
deteriorated financial profile. In addition, Spain exhibits a high degree of alignment
between financial and tax accounting; therefore private firms face great incentives to
manipulate their earnings in order minimize their tax payments (Burgstahler et al.
2006 or Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the legal and
institutional background in which this study is conducted. Section 3 summarizes the
literature underpinning the hypotheses we propose to test. The Sect. 4 presents the
research design, including an in-depth description of our earnings-quality measures
and regression models and the sample and descriptive statistics. Results are reported
in Sect. 5, and Sect. 6 presents conclusions.
2 Institutional background
2.1 The legal framework of the external oversight of statutory audits:
the Spanish setting within the European context
Within the European Union, the audit regulatory reforms of the 21st century followed
the path of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. One
of its bases was to move away from the peer-review process of audit quality super-
vision administered by the AICPA, which had long been criticized for its lack of
independence and credibility (see, e.g., Fogarty 1996; Public Overisght Board 2002).
The self-regulation framework was replaced in the USA by the independent PCAOB,
created under Section 104 of SOX, which conducts inspections of registered public
accounting firms that provide audits for publicly traded companies.
García-Osma et al. (2014) have classified the quality assurance systems of the
Member States into three categories: a professionally self-regulated system with peer-
review (France, Ireland, and theUK), a governmental public oversight system (Finland
and Sweden), and a mixed system (Belgium, Germany, and Spain). Consistent with
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the international trend of harmonizing the audit legislation, the Directive 2006/43/EC
also backed a more independent supervisory framework. In particular, the European
rule required that Member States emphasize that the quality assurance system must
be independent of the reviewed statutory auditors and subject to public oversight (art.
26 Directive 2006/43/EC).
In order to enhance the quality of the statutory audits, the transposition of the
directive to the legislation of the Member States also accomplishes two processes
of supervision: (a) the external supervision of the auditor’s internal quality control
system or inspections (art. 29 Directive 2006/43/EC) and (b) the external supervision
of the working papers of the audit engagements or investigations (art. 30.1 Directive
2006/43/EC). The supervisory function should be complemented with effective and
dissuasive sanctions (art. 30.2 Directive 2006/43/EC). More specifically, it states that:
Without prejudice to Member States’ civil liability regimes, Member States
shall provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties in respect of
statutory auditors and audit firms, where statutory audits are not carried out in
conformity with the provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive
(art. 30.2 chap. VII, Directive 2006/43/EC).
All in all, the European legislation requires that all statutory auditors and auditing
firms should be submitted to regular inspections conducted by independent bodies
and that Member States should implement effective investigation and disciplinary
systems thatwould help to detect and prevent auditmalpractice. Despite this regulatory
endeavor to harmonize supervisory regimes, the implementationof the public oversight
boards across European countries is not homogeneous, and significant differences
persist (García-Osma et al. 2014).
In Spain, the twenty-first century brought about deep accounting (a critical review
of the process is offered by Gonzalo Angulo 2014) and auditing reforms, but the audit-
ing legislative framework had already embraced an independent supervisory body, the
ICAC, from the enactment of the Audit Act in 1988.7 Nevertheless, it is remarkable
that Spain exhibits a mixed supervisory system (García-Osma et al. 2014), because
the ICAC has both the ultimate responsibility for the quality assurance of the statutory
audits and for the provision of effective investigation and disciplinary systems (art. 22
Audit Act 19/1988 and in similar terms art 27.3.d Audit Act 1/20118,) but the Spanish
legislation also requires professional associations to oversee the quality of statutory
audits (art. 75.f Royal Decree 19909 and, in similar terms, art. 65.2 Royal Decree
2011.10)
7 Ley 19/1988 de 12 de julio de Auditoría de Cuentas.
8 The Audit Act 1988 was amended by the Ley 12/2010 de 30 de junio and repealed by the Real Decreto
Legislativo 1/2011 de 1 de julio, por el que se aprueba el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Auditoría de Cuentas
(hereafter Audit Act 1/2011), but the date of enforcement of both legislative texts is beyond the temporal
scope of our empirical analysis.
9 Real Decreto (1636/1990), de 20 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento que desarrolla la
Ley 19/1988, de 12 de Julio, de auditoría de cuenta.
10 The Royal Decree 1990 was repealed by the Real Decreto 1517/2011 de 31 de octubre, por el que se
aprueba el Reglamento que desarrolla el Texto Refundido de la Ley de Auditoría de Cuentas 1/2011 de 1
de julio.
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Fig. 1 The average timing of the sanctioning process
Regarding the sanctioning scheme, the Financial Act 44/200211 and the Audit Act
1/2011 broadened the original two categories of infractions (minor and serious) to
include a third—very serious infractions—complemented by the severest penalties.
The reforms also resulted in a widening of the circumstances constituting infractions.
2.2 The investigation process in Spain
As stated in prior sections, in Spain, the supervisory system embraces the investiga-
tions of specific audit engagements through the review of the working papers and the
inspections of the internal quality control systems of the auditing firms. Because our
analysis focuses on the investigations, we will further explain this type of supervision.
According to auditing legislation,12 the initiation of the investigation process by
the ICAC inspectors can be made (a) ex-officio, according to an annual plan based on
prior evidence provided by the quality controls of the professional associations, ana-
lytical procedures, or other objective indicators; or (b) at the behest of any party able
to show a legitimate interest. The most common process for starting the investigation
was actually the latter, pursuant to a legal claim from a shareholder or another supervi-
sory board (stock market, insurance, or bank authorities, for example). Although less
frequent, the investigations also started as a result of the quality controls conducted
by the professional associations of the ICAC.13
The timing process of ICAC’s investigation, depicted in Fig. 1, is of particular rel-
evance in this study. Typically, 15 days before the start date of the technical control,
individual auditors or auditing firms are notified by the ICAC that a certain engage-
ment will be subject to investigation. Importantly, the announcement occurs after the
corresponding financial statements and its related audit report are placed in the Official
Business Register,14 so that none of those documents can be modified once the control
process is announced. Hence, the auditor’s reaction, if any, can be perceived only after
the announcement of the inspection.
11 Ley de Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero 44/2002, de 22 de noviembre.
12 See art. 28 Audit Act 1/2011 and art. 64 Royal Decree 2011 and, in similar terms, the former art. 22
Audit Act 1988 and art. 65, 66 and 67 Royal Decree 1990.
13 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for providing details related to the initiation and development
of the investigation process.
14 In Spain, all limited liability companies are required to register their financial statements in a local
business register.
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The whole process encompasses (a) a preliminary investigation process, which
normally takes 6 months, conducted after receiving the complaint or detecting the
malpractice; (b) the investigation period,which lasts nomore than 18months (art. 30.3.
Royal Decree 2011); and (c) the appeal for reversal to the Ministry of Economy, to
whom the ICACbelongs,which takes amaximumof 6months. If theMinistry confirms
the decision, the sanction is valid and effective and is published in the ICAC’s official
bulletin (Boletín del Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas, BOICAC),
which is publicly available.
Although the infractions can be classified as minor, serious, and very serious (art.
32 Royal Decree 2011), only the last two categories and their penalties are released in
the BOICAC. The auditor can appeal in Spain’s Administrative Court, however, and
this process can take between 1 and 3 years to be resolved.
The sanctions can be eithermonetary or nonmonetary, including, for themost severe
infractions, temporary or even permanent suspension from the Official Register of
Auditors (ROAC), which would disallow the auditor to sign statutory audit reports.
When the infraction is attributed to an auditing firm, the sanctions are imposed on both
the auditing firm and the engagement partner—the partner responsible for the audit,
who signs the report.
Regarding the transparency of the oversight process, the ICAC releases an annual
report, which includes a summary of the quality controls conducted in the previous
year, alongwith forthcomingwork programs (following art. 32Directive 2006/43/EC).
Nonetheless, unlike other regulatory bodies (PCAOB in USA or the Financial Report-
ing Council in Britain, for instance), the ICAC does not include in its periodical
information either the number of or the names of the auditing firms that received clean
supervision reports after an inspection or an investigation process, the reason for the
initiation of the supervision, or the scope of the investigation process.15
The auditor’s enforcement releases from 1995 to 2007 are summarized in Table
1. As Panel A reveals, the ICAC official bulletins disclosed 338 infractions, 192 of
which correspond to individual auditors and 146 to auditing firms. As depicted in
Panel B, the serious infraction which consists of the “non-compliance with auditing
standards that could have a significant impact on the outcome of the audit work and,
accordingly, on the audit report” is the most common for both the audit firms (130
observations) and individual auditors (166 observations). Regarding the disciplinary
actions, Panel C in Table 1 shows that nonmonetary sanctions, such as a temporary
suspension from the Official Register of Auditors, are imposed primarily on individual
auditors. By contrast, auditing firms tend to receive heavier monetary sanctions than
individual auditors do, because the fines imposed on individual auditors are subject
to a cap, which is aimed at capturing the size differences between auditing firms and
individual auditors’ portfolios.
15 As explained in Sect. 2, until 1996 the ICAC used to publish reports with extensive information on
the number and the type of detected weaknesses and on the arguments and discrepancies expressed by the
sanctioned auditors. The ICAC ceased to publish these reports in 1997, however, in response to pressure
exerted by the whole Spanish auditing profession. Since then, only basic or primary information has been
disclosed, consisting basically of the names of the auditor and auditee, the type of infraction detected, and
the sanction imposed.
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Table 1 Auditor’s enforcement releases in Spain for the 1995–2007 period
Audit firms Individual
auditors
Panel A: Types of infractions
Serious 146 190
Very serious 0 1
No information 0 1
Total 146 192
Panel B: Categories of serious infractions
Non-compliance with the obligation to
perform a mandatory audit in the
course of a firm engagement
0 0
Issuance of an audit report not based
on the evidence obtained through
the audit procedures
0 0
Non-compliance with auditing
standards that could have a
significant impact on the outcome of
audit work and, accordingly, on the
audit report
130 166
Non-compliance with the provisions
regarding auditor independence
13 19
Failure to report information required
by the Institute of Accounting and
Auditing
2 3
Acceptance of an engagement
prohibited by law
0 1
Acceptance of an audit engagement
without being registered in the
Official Register of Auditors
0 1
Not fulfillment of the requisites for
auditing financial and insurance
firms
1 0
Total 146 90
Audit firms Individual
auditors
Audit firm Audit partner
Panel C: Sanctions enforced due to serious infractions
Non-monetary sanctions
Public warning 2 3 1
Temporary suspension 0 5 36
Monetary sanctions
Below e6.00000 103 63 117
Above e6.00000 41 17 36
Total 146 88 190
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3 Earnings management in Spanish private companies
Private companies constitute the majority of the European Union economy and the
EU client market for audit services, and Spain is no exception. Therefore, the audi-
tees considered in this study are typically private companies, which, according to the
earnings management literature, have a specific set of incentives regarding finan-
cial reporting (Ali et al. 2007; Wang 2006; Burgstahler et al. 2006). The capital
structure of private companies shows a higher average concentration and manager-
ial ownership than public companies do, and shareholders have access through private
channels of information to relevant data on the company’s economic performance.
Therefore, private client companies arguably face lower agency costs and information
asymmetries than stock-market-quoted companies do, but they still have incentives
to manipulate earnings because of the conflicts that may arise between controlling
and non-controlling shareholders, debt holders, government, and other stakehold-
ers.
In addition, according toLaPorta et al. (1998) andLeuz et al. (2003), Spain hasweak
legal protection for investors and weak enforcement mechanisms, whereby insiders
and even large shareholders can enjoy large private control benefits with low litigation
risk which leads to more pervasive earnings management (Burgstahler et al. 2006). As
a result, the quality of financial reporting could be severely damaged by accounting
manipulation practices. More precisely, incentives for earnings management in private
companies in Spain arise from three sources. (1) Spain is a bank-oriented economy
in which private companies typically hold long-term relationships with banks. Within
this relationship-lending environment, banks collect financial information privately
rather than via financial statements. Demand for accounting information is lower than
in other settings, and earnings quality is therefore lower. (2) Companies face strong
incentives to avoid bottom-line losses Gallén and Giner (2005) when borrowing from
banks (Cano 2007), in order to mitigate the negative economic consequences of a
deteriorated financial profile. The loan loss provisioning system established by the
Bank of Spain requires banks to classify loans as non-performing if the borrower
exhibits recurrent negative earnings. Because lenders are required to cover up to 25 %
of non-performing loans, borrowers face strong incentives to avoid negative earnings
in order to reduce the ex-ante cost of debt. (3) As a French legal-origin country,
Spain exhibits a high degree of alignment between financial and tax accounting, and
tax authorities rely on a company’s financial statements to assess taxable income.
According to the earnings management literature (Burgstahler et al. 2006 or Van
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008), this tight link between accounting numbers and
taxable income is expected to boost a company’s incentive to manipulate reported
profits in order to minimize tax payments.
In summary, the Spanish legal framework contains few control mechanisms to
mitigate the earnings manipulation of private companies, and owner-managers face
incentives to apply different earnings management strategies in reporting bottom-
line figures; they are motivated to avoid losses in order to reduce bank-debt
associated costs and to minimize profits in order to reduce related income tax pay-
ments.
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4 Hypothesis development
4.1 Do disciplinary sanctions identify low-quality auditors?
Because the ICACdoes not disclose information about the results of the quality reviews
by the professional associations and the preliminary investigations conducted by the
ICAC every year, we do not know the percentage of reviewed engagements that meet
the auditing standards. In addition, as stated in Sect. 2, ICAC investigations do not
comprise all the engagements of the reviewed auditor. Rather, they involve a specific
audit, which is selected according to an ex-ante assessment of audit fraud, because the
ICAC’s investigation process usually begins only after it receives a legal claim from
an interested party (frequently a request from another supervisory body) or the finding
of a report of a professional association’s audit supervision. It is plausible, therefore,
to estimate that most engagement investigations end up with a sanction, but because
penalization is associated with a particular engagement, we cannot infer that audit
malpractice can be extended to other client audit engagements within that auditing
firm’s portfolio (DeFond 2010).
In order for disciplinary sanctions to spur an increase in audit quality, then, it
is expected that sanctioned auditors must be bad auditors—auditors who engage in
generalized auditing misconduct—which, we approach through the permissiveness
toward accounting manipulation. Because sanctions are imposed because of a single,
specific audit rather than systematic audit malpractice, if penalized auditors are not bad
auditors, then changes in auditor’s behavior in the post-inspection period are expected
to be marginal, regardless of the economic and reputation losses subsequent to the
public disclosure of sanctions. In sum, whether or not sanctions are indicative of an
auditor’s low overall audit quality is an empirical question.
Accordingly, we first determine if sanctioned auditors may be considered bad
auditors, particularly if they generally exhibit greater tolerance for higher earnings
management practices than non-sanctioned auditors do. In this regard, DeFond and
Lennox (2011) report that low-quality auditors are more likely to receive external
reports comprising quality deficiencies. Gunny and Zhang (2013a) show that for audit-
ing firms inspected triennially, the disclosure of severe deficiencies in the inspector’s
report is associated with higher current abnormal accruals in the auditee’s financial
statements. Low-quality auditors also exhibit greater propensity to reformulate the
annual accounts.
Similar to the PCAOB inspection program, we expect the external ICAC investiga-
tions to be effective in identifying low-quality auditors. Thus, we expect our empirical
evidence to be inconsistent with null Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1 In the pre-inspection period, clients of sanctioned auditors exhibit the
same level of earnings quality as do clients of non-sanctioned auditors.
4.2 Do disciplinary sanctions enhance the penalized auditor’s quality?
Sanctions are expected to trigger a change in auditor’s behavior because they entail
economic losses steaming from both financial penalties and reputational harm.
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Scholarly contributions on this issue are scarce and inconclusive. Several researchers
have tried to determine if the external inspections alone can accomplish a change in
audit quality. Carcello et al. (2011) corroborate this hypothesis and have documented
a reduction in abnormal accruals resulting from the PCAOB inspection process, and a
greater reduction after a second inspection. The evidence is stronger for those auditees
that exhibit positive abnormal accruals. The authors conclude that the increase in audit
quality is not a temporary phenomenon, but that it lasts after the first inspection and
further increases after a second inspection.
Because audit quality is not directly observable by users, the incentive to avoid a
negative inspection report may arise from the reputational damage associated with
the public disclosure of the infractions (Gunny and Zhang 2013b). Indeed, some US
literature (see, e.g.,Menon andWilliams 1994;Baber et al. 1995; Chaney and Philipich
2002) provides empirical evidence on capital-market effects of auditor reputation loss
following high-profile financial scandals.
The literature on the effects of auditor reputation loss following disciplinary actions
is relatively limited, however. Public disclosure of audit malpractices and the auditee’s
intentions to signal a desire for audit quality may precipitate the dismissal of defi-
cient auditors. Auditing firms involved in SECAccounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases, for example, tend to lose market share relative to their competitors (Wilson
and Grimlund 1990) and those receiving clean reports from the peer-review inspectors
tend to gain more clients than do firms receiving modified or adverse opinions (Hilary
and Lennox 2005). DeFond and Lennox (2011) have demonstrated that audit-market
exiting firms are more likely to have received an audit report that included deficien-
cies and to have avoided quality controls. Gunny and Zhang (2013b) have shown that
auditees whose inspected auditors were found GAAP-deficient were more likely to
dismiss them in favor of inspected auditors who received a clean report. They also
identify PCAOB inspection reports as having created heterogeneity in brand-name rep-
utations among the group usually labeled “Non-Big Auditors”. Conversely, Lennox
and Pittman (2010) conclude that auditing firms’ market shares are insensitive to their
PCAOB inspection reports. Moreover, their findings suggest that the auditing market
effects of peer-review reports declined after the creation of the PCAOB, because these
reports became narrower in scope. In sum, previous literature supports the notion that
auditor reputational loss leads to a decrease in client stock returns and a subsequent
decline in the market share of auditing firms.
Thus, prior studies provide some, albeit inconclusive, evidence that auditors try
to avoid receiving inspectors’ reports that disclose deficiencies. This research leads
to a related empirical question: Do these fears of receiving a deficient rating from
an inspection cause auditors to upgrade their audit methodology and enhance their
audit quality? DeFond (2010) supports the idea that PCAOB inspections may improve
audit quality if PCAOB inspectors hold the auditors to stricter standards and are able
to impose costly penalties. In a sample of triennially inspected auditing firms, only
those auditors receiving a PCAOB report including deficiencies tended to modify
their outcomes by exhibiting higher likelihood to issuing a going-concern opinion for
financially distressed clients in the post-inspection period than they did before being
supervised (Gramling et al. 2011). Evidence on auditorswho receive a clean inspection
report was more limited. In the same vein, Carcello et al. (2011) have demonstrated a
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significant reduction in abnormal accruals in the year following a PCAOB inspection,
and these results are stronger for auditees that reported positive abnormal accruals
before the inspection.
Because thewhole investigation process takes a long time and disciplinary sanctions
may significantly damage auditor reputation, auditors face strong incentives to enhance
their audit quality at the beginning of the investigation process, either to influence the
final outcome of the ICAC or to counteract reputational damage. Hence, we expect
our empirical evidence to be inconsistent with null Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2 Clients of sanctioned auditors exhibit the same level of earnings quality
in the pre- and post-inspection period.
5 Research design
5.1 Sample selection
Our sample comprises audited financial statements of nonfinancial companies with a
fiscal year end within our 1995–2007 period of study, before the implementation of
the New Accounting Plan in 2007. We collected their financial information from the
Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System (Sistemas de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos,
SABI).
After coding the auditors’ names, we matched the data on the ICAC inspection
reports with the information on Spanish firms included in the SABI database and
grouped the financial statements into sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors. Because
there is empirical evidence indicating that audit quality is not homogeneous at a
national level for the entire auditing firm—that it may differ across offices (Fergu-
son et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005)—we grouped the auditor’s clients at a provincial
level. Thus a single auditing firm operating in two different provinces is considered
as two different auditing firms.
As reported in Panel A of Table 2, the initial database contained 274,291 audited
financial statements corresponding to the Spanish nonfinancial firms, but we were
able to collect the required information from only 210,273 firm-year observations,
which comprises our final sample. Of these, 14,068 firm/year observations refer to the
financial statements supervised by a sanctioned auditor either before or after the com-
mencement of the ICAC’s investigations. Table 2 reports the total number of firm/year
observations, classified by type of auditor (Big 4 vs. Non-Big 4), time (pre- and post-
investigation period), and type of sanction (i.e. High sanctions include nonmonetary
penalties and fines higher than e6000; Low sanctions include fines below e6000).
Endogeneity constitutes a key concern in the relationship between external sanc-
tions and audit quality.Misleading client companies may engage bad auditors to revise
their financial statements, so that poor earnings quality may not be caused by low audit
quality; but rather bad client companies—for our purposes, earnings managers—with
poor earnings quality may choose to hire bad auditors. In this paper, we control for
endogeneity in auditor selection by running our models on a subsample of firms with
financial statements audited by at least one sanctioned auditor in the pre-inspection
period and one non-sanctioned auditor in any year of the sample period. To achieve
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Table 2 Sample selection
Panel A: Overall sample
A Total firm/year observations (1995–2007) 274,291
B Financial statements with available information on firm’s auditor 210,273
C Financial statements supervised by a sanctioned auditor 14,068
(i) Big N ( Non Big N) 10,202 (3866)
(ii) Before (after) the start date of inspections 3737 (10,331)
(iii) Low (high) Sanction 7838 (6230)
Panel B. Subsample used in the analysis of loss avoidance through extraordinary items:
financial statements supervised, at least, by one sanctioned auditor (before the inspection)
and one non-sanctioned auditor during the period 1995–1997
A Sanctioned versus non-sanctioned auditors
(i) Initial number of observations with non missing values 5261
(ii) Less number of observations corresponding to firms with all
positive or all negative earnings
(2753)
(iii) Final number of observations used in the loss avoidance tests 2508
B Before versus after the start date of inspections
(i) Initial number of observations with non missing values 12,122
(ii) Less number of observations corresponding to firms with all
positive or all negative earnings
(7780)
(iii) Final number of observations used in the loss avoidance tests 4342
Panel C Subsample used in the analysis of discretionary accruals: financial statements
supervised, at least, by one sanctioned auditor (before the inspection) and one
non-sanctioned auditor during the period 1995–1997
A Sanctioned versus non-sanctioned auditors
(i) Initial number of observations with non missing values 5017
(ii) Less number observations of top and bottom 0.5 % of growth,
leverage and Roa
(66)
(iii) Final number of observations used in the discretionary accruals
tests
4951
B Before versus after the start date of inspections
(i) Initial number of observations with non missing values 11,584
(ii) Less number observations of top and bottom 0.5 % of growth,
leverage and Roa
(323)
(iii) Final number of observations used in the discretionary accruals
tests
11261
a clean comparison between the two types of auditors, we remove from the database
the financial statements that instigated the ICAC inspection and those supervised by
sanctioned auditors in the post-inspection period.
To evaluate empirically the effects of the ICAC disciplinary actions on audit quality,
we compute our two proxies for earnings quality in the pre- and post-inspection period,
using exclusively the financial statements revised by sanctioned auditors.
In Panels B to C of Table 2, we report the number of observations used in the analy-
sis of loss avoidance and abnormal accruals, respectively. After removing outliers,
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the analysis of loss avoidance through extraordinary items (discretionary accruals) is
based on a sample of 2508 (4951) firm-year observations for the comparison between
sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors and 4342 (11,261) firm-year observations for
the comparison between the pre- and post-inspection periods.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on a set of performance, solvency, and earnings-
quality indicators corresponding to the portfolios of sanctioned and non-sanctioned
auditors. In particular, descriptive statistics are computed after excluding outliers,
which are defined as the observations outside the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile of the
continuous variables. The empirical evidence included in Table 3 suggests that firms
have similar performance and solvency across subsamples. The cash flow to total assets
ratio (CFO_ASSETS), the return on assets ratio (Roa) and the net increase in sales
(Growth) are approximately 9, 4, and 10 % respectively, whereas the leverage ratio
(LEV) is slightly above 60 %. The median absolute value of discretionary accruals
(ABS_DA), however, which is higher for the sanctioned auditors’ portfolio, reflects
higher earnings quality for the firms with financial statements supervised by non-
sanctioned auditors.
Table 4 presents the Spearman’s correlation coefficients among the variables con-
sidered in Table 3. The correlation coefficients between discretionary accruals and
leverage, growth, and performance are statistically significant, and their signs are in
the direction expected.
5.3 Measures of earnings quality
Because audit quality is not observable, in this paper we use two common surrogates of
earnings quality: the loss avoidance through extraordinary items and the discretionary
component of accruals.
5.3.1 Loss avoidance through extraordinary items
As shown in Fig. 2, extraordinary items are widely used by Spanish firms as an
earnings management tool. Indeed, 60 % of the firms with slightly negative ordinary
income reported positive bottom-line earnings during the period 1995–2007. To evalu-
ate whether this earnings management strategy is associated with ICAC’s disciplinary
sanctions, we (1) restrict the sample to the client companies that exhibit negative ordi-
nary net income, and (2) test whether the proportion of auditees reporting bottom-line
losses depends on the type of auditor. Specifically, to test Hypothesis 1, we check if
auditees of sanctioned auditors exhibit the same level of earnings quality (i.e. report
ordinary and bottom-line losses), as do auditees of non-sanctioned auditors in the
pre-inspection period. Similarly, to test Hypothesis 2, we determine if the clients of
sanctioned auditors exhibit the same level of financial information quality (i.e. report
ordinary and bottom-line losses) in the pre- and post-investigation periods.
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean SD 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
Panel A: Variables of sanctioned auditors’ clients
Abs_da 11,171 0.100 0.100 0.030 0.069 0.136
Loss 11,921 0.180 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ord_loss 11,921 0.198 0.398 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ni 11,921 0.007 0.076 −0.022 0.005 0.034
Roa 11,921 0.040 0.093 0.006 0.035 0.081
Financing 11,921 0.253 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000
Lev 11,921 0.643 0.242 0.478 0.668 0.814
Growth 11,921 0.107 0.336 −0.021 0.071 0.177
Cfo_assets 11,921 0.094 0.193 −0.001 0.088 0.194
Lag_Ppe_fin 11,921 0.553 0.490 0.180 0.442 0.832
Panel B: Variables of Non-sanctioned auditors’ clients
Abs_da 166,153 0.090 0.091 0.028 0.062 0.121
Loss 172,368 0.136 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ord_loss 172,368 0.179 0.384 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ni 172, 368 0.005 0.066 −0.021 0.003 0.030
Roa 172,368 0.040 0.074 0.008 0.032 0.072
Financing 172,368 0.304 0.460 0.000 0.000 1.000
Lev 172,368 0.612 0.230 0.451 0.635 0.785
Growth 172,368 0.097 0.291 −0.021 0.065 0.167
Cfo_assets 172,368 0.088 0.169 0.006 0.088 0.175
Lag_Ppe_fin 172,368 0.586 0.423 0.261 0.509 0.835
Abs_da absolute value of discretionary accruals cross-sectionally estimated using themodified JonesModel,
loss 1 if the firm reports losses and 0, otherwise, Ord_loss 1 if the firm discloses negative earnings
before extraordinary items and 0, otherwise, Ni change in net operating income over lagged total assets,
Roa earnings divided by total assets, Financing 1 if bank debts increase at least 20 % and 0, otherwise,
leverage ratio of total debt to total assets, growth percentage increase in sales, Cfo_assets earnings before
extraordinary items − total accruals over lagged total assets, Lag_Ppe_fin lagged value of the ratio of
property, plant and equipment plus long term financial assets divided by total assets
Because the set of firmswith negative ordinary net income is not randomly selected,
the inference drawn from a regular probit model may not extend to the unobserved
group. Observations included in the sample are expected to present characteristics that
differ from those of the other firms, which may be correlated with either the decision
of hiring a non-sanctioned auditor or the changes in auditor behavior in the post-
inspection period. We therefore estimate a probit selection model (Van de Ven and
Van Pragg 1981) consisting of two binary dependent variables: Loss, which equals 1
if the firm exhibits bottom-line losses and 0 otherwise; and OrdLoss, which equals 1 if
the firm reports negative ordinary income and 0 otherwise. Because we are interested
in analyzing those companies with ordinary losses, in our setting, Loss is observed
only if OrdLoss = 1. Binary outcomes may be expressed using the following set of
models:
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Fig. 2 Loss avoidance through extraordinary items (1995–2007), the bars refer to the median value of
the net income to total assets ratio corresponding to each portfolio of firms. The red line represents the
proportion of firms in each portfolio disclosing positive bottom line profits. The minimum and maximum
number of firms included in each portfolio is 451 and 30,455 respectively
Model I: Through the equations of the following Model I, we test Hypothesis 1 (i.e.
the significance of the sanction over the auditing firm in disclosing bottom-line losses
in the pre-investigation period) as:
Ord Loss∗i t = β0 + β1Cash_ f lowi t + β2Leverageit + β3Growthit
+β4 I nd Ord Lossit + i t (1a)
Loss∗i t = α0 + α1Sanc_Audit + α2Lag Ppe_ f init
+α3 I nd ExtraLossit + εi t (1b)
Model II: Similar toModel I, by running the equations ofModel II we test Hypothesis 2
to determine if, for those companies audited by sanctioned auditors that report ordinary
losses, the period of analysis (pre- and post-sanction) is statistically associated to
reporting bottom-line losses:
Ord Loss∗i t = β0 + β1Cash_ f lowi t + β2Leverageit
+β3Growthit + β4 I nd Ord Lossit + i t (2a)
Loss∗i t = α0 + α1Event_Sancit + α2Lag Ppe_ f init
+α3 I nd ExtraLossit + εi t (2b)
In Eqs. 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, for firm i and fiscal year t:
OrdLoss = 1 if the firm reports negative ordinary losses in year t and 0 otherwise.
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CashFlow = Cash-Flow/Total assetst−1.
Leverage = Total Debtt/Total assetst.
Growth = Salest − Salest−1/Salest−1.
IndOrdLoss = Firms reporting ordinary lossest/Total firms of the firm i industrial
sector.
Loss = 1 if the firm reports bottom-line losses in year t , and 0 otherwise.
Sanc_Aud = 1 if the financial statements were audited by a sanctioned auditor in
any year of the pre-sanction period, and 0 otherwise.
Event_Sanc = 1 if it refers to the pre-sanction period, and 0 otherwise.
LagPpe_fin = (Property, plant and equipmentt+ Long-termfinancial assetst)/Total
assetst−1.
IndExtraLoss = Firms reporting extraordinary lossest/Total firms in the industrial
sector of firmi.
Through the logistic regressions in Eqs. 1b and 2b, we estimate the probability of
reporting negative net income when the firm also reports ordinary losses, which, under
our approach, we identify with higher audit quality. The latent propensity of reporting
losses is affected by our two variables of interest (Sanc_Aud and Event_Sanc) and a
set of control variables, including Cash flow, Leverage, and Growth. The industrial
sector bias is captured by IndOrdLoss and IndExtraLoss, which, in both cases, are
computed by using firm-year observations corresponding to firms that never hired a
sanctioned auditor during the sample period.
According to our null hypotheses, estimate coefficients of variables Sanc_Aud and
Event_Sanc are expected to be negative and positive, respectively.
The estimation of the model relies on the assumption that the error terms (, ε)
follow a zero-mean, unit-variance bivariate normal distribution, with corr (, ε) =
p > 0. In this context, estimating the loss equation without considering the effects of
the selection equation may lead to biased estimates of the regression coefficients of
Eqs. 1b and 2b.
5.3.2 Discretionary accruals
As a second measure of earnings quality, we conduct an empirical analysis of the non-
discretionary accruals component of earnings. Because the Spanish firms were not
obliged to disclose the statement of cash flows during the sample period, we estimate
total accruals using the balance sheet approach, similar to that of Arnedo Ajona et al.
(2008). Non-discretionary accruals are estimated using the cross-sectional version
(Dechow et al. 1995) of the modified Jones (1991) model:
N D Ait
T Ait−1
= α + β0 1
T Ait−1
+ β1REVit − ARit
T Ait−1
+ β2 P P Eit
T Ait−1
+ ϑi t (3)
Where N D Ait are the non-discretionary accruals; REVit − ARit are the sales
change net of the variations in account receivables; and P P Eit is net plant, property,
and equipment.We deflate by lagged total assets (TAi t−1) and, following Kothari et al.
(2005), we include an intercept (α) in the estimation to mitigate heteroskedasticity.
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The estimation of the model involves all firm-year observations in the same two-
digit industry. To reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers we remove the
observations outside the 5th and 95th percentiles of the explanatory and dependent
variables. We exclude the industry-year combinations with less than 20 observations.
In this paper, we focus on the signed and unsigned residual of the modified Jones
Model (SD Ait = ϑi t and U D Ait = |ϑi t |), which, according to previous literature,
are assumed to be inversely correlated to earnings quality.16
To test our set of hypotheses on the relationship between disciplinary sanctions and
earnings quality, we consider the following regression model:
D Ait =
J∑
j=1
α j f irm j + β1Sanc_audit +
C∑
c=1
βc+1controlit + ϕi t (4a)
D Ait =
J∑
j=1
α j f irm j + β1Event_Sancit +
C∑
c=1
βc+1controlit + ϕi t (4b)
where the dependent variable DA refers to either unsigned discretionary accruals
(UDA) or signed discretionary accruals (SDA); firm is a firm-fixed effect aimed at
capturing constant and non-observable characteristics of the firms that are potentially
correlated to the dependent variable, and Control refers to a set of control variables,
including Roa, the ratio of earnings over total assets; Financing, which is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if long-term debts increase at least by 20 % during year t and 0
otherwise; Leverage, which is the ratio of total debt over total assets; Growth, which is
defined as the current year growth in sales; and RUDA, which enters the model only in
the UDA specification and refers to the ratio of UDAs over total assets in the same year
and industry. This ratio is computed by using firm-year observations corresponding to
firms that never hired a sanctioned auditor during the sample period. Finally, for our
variables of interest, Sanc_aud refers to whether or not the auditor was sanctioned and
Event_Sanc refers to the pre- and post-sanction period.
In the UDA specification, we expect the coefficient β1 to be positive if Sanc_Aud is
used as the partitioning variable and negative if Event_Sanc is included in the regres-
sion model. Regarding control variables, previous literature suggests the existence
of a direct link between firm performance and discretionary accruals. Kothari et al.
(2005) include Roa as an additional regressor in the modified Jones model and find it
significant, even in a context in which they do not expect the hypothesis of earnings
management to hold. With regard to debt, we control for the inception of long-term
debt through the variableFinancing, which is expected to be positively associated with
discretionary accruals, as debtors face incentives to inflate earnings to reduce their per-
ceived riskiness (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Except for the inception year, we expect an
inverse correlation between Leverage and discretionary accruals, because firms are
16 We consider unsigned discretionary accruals (UDA) to evaluate the effect of disciplinary sanctions on
both income-decreasing and income-increasing accounting policies. A specific set of control variables is
incorporated into models (4a) and (4b) to mitigate the shortcomings of the UDA specification, pointed out
by Hribar and Nichols (2007).
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under pressure to report conservatively, so as to build up reserves (Ahmed et al. 2002).
Finally, we also expect a positive correlation between discretionary accruals and both
RUDA and Growth.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Do sanctions reflect isolated or generalized audit malpractice?
6.1.1 Loss avoidance through extraordinary items
As shown in Fig. 2, when ordinary income is slightly negative, Spanish firms use
extraordinary items to avoid bottom-line losses. Non-sanctioned auditors are expected
to constrain the manipulation of extraordinary items more than sanctioned auditors
are.
In Panels A and B of Table 5 we report the results of the logistic regression models
that capture the probability of clients’ loss avoidance through extraordinary items. The
logit models are run for the whole sample and for different subsamples comprising
Big 4 and Non-Big 4 clients.
Data displayed in Table 5, Panel A, show that only clients of Non-Big 4 sanctioned
auditors (Sanc_Aud) exhibit significantly higher likelihood of avoiding reporting neg-
ative bottom-line earnings (p < 0.01). Regarding control variables, all the coefficients
in the selection equation reported in PanelB are significant and their sign is as expected,
whereas in the outcome equation the coefficients are not significant at conventional
levels.
6.1.2 Discretionary accruals
As a second indicator of earnings management, we use both SDAs and UDAs. Panel
A of Table 6 reports the difference in average discretionary accruals between firms
hiring sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors. These differences are computed for the
whole sample and across subsamples formed according to type of auditor (Big 4 vs.
Non-Big 4). The mean of UDA is significantly higher when firms engage a sanctioned
auditor (pvalue < 0.01). As opposed to the prior loss avoidance result, however, the
main differences between the sanctioned and the non-sanctioned auditors’ portfolios
arise in the Big 4 subsample. Regarding SDAs, the firms hiring a Big 4 sanctioned
auditor exhibit significantly lower income-decreasing accruals.
Panel B of Table 6 displays the results of the regression of UDAs on the variable
that captures whether or not the auditor was sanctioned (Sanc_Aud) and a set of
control variables, including firm-fixed effects. Estimations are conducted for thewhole
sample and for two other subsamples formed by the clients of Big 4 and Non Big-4
auditing firms. The coefficients are jointly significant in all equations and adjusted
R2 is approximately 23 %. Significance levels of individual coefficients are based on
two-tailed p values, which are robust to heteroskedasticity and firm-clustering effects.
The variable of interest (Sanc_Aud) exhibits only weak significance when the auditor
is one of the Big 4 auditing firms.
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Table 5 Loss avoidance through extraordinary items of firms engaging sanctioned and non-sanctioned
auditors
Sanctioned vs non-sanctioned auditors
All auditors Type of auditors
Big N Non-Big N
Pred sign Coeff (z) Coeff (z) Coeff (z)
Panel A: Probit regression. Dependent variable = Loss
Sanc_Aud (−) −0.1155 (−1.44) −0.1156 (−1.14) −0.4198*** (−2.68)
Lag_Ppe_fin −0.1077 (−1.15) −0.1593 (−1.29) 0.1317 (0.81)
IndExtraLoss −73.799*** (−2.79) −72.742** (−2.34) −39.077 (−0.79)
Constant 1.5509*** (15.48) 1.8328*** (17.70) 0.9478*** (4.55)
N 5725 3217 2044
χ2 13.6*** 10.8** 8.94**
Panel B: Probit regression. Dependent variable = Ord Loss
Cash Flow (−) −1.8011*** (−16.12) −1.7354*** (−12.95) −1.9610*** (−8.90)
Leverage (+) 1.3400*** (15.12) 1.3880*** (12.47) 1.2418*** (7.97)
Growth (−) −0.6800*** (−9.93) −0.5554*** (−7.06) −1.1308*** (−7.73)
IndOrdLosses (+) 3.1064*** (10.29) 2.4982*** (6.30) 4.1032*** (8.33)
Constant −2.2267*** (−25.17) −2.0694*** (−18.57) −2.3209*** (−15.18)
N 1059 661 398
ρ −0.5612*** −0.6921*** −0.3630**
This table shows the parameter estimates for a probit regression model with sample selection, which may
be expressed using the following equations:
Loss∗i t = α0 + α1Sanc_Audit + α2Lag_Ppe_ f init + α3 I nd ExtraLossit + εi t
Ord Loss∗i t = β0 + β1Cash_ f lowi t + β2Leverageit + β3Growthit + β4 I nd Ord Lossit + i t
Loss∗i t is the realization of the latent value of the firm’s propensity to report bottom-line losses. The firm
reports positive bottom-line earnings if Loss∗i t < 0, and posts losses if Loss∗i t ≥ 0. The latent propensity of
reporting losses is affected by Sanc_Aud and a set of control variables. Lag_Ppe_fin is defined as the lagged
ratio of property, plant and equipment plus long term financial assets over total assets and I nd ExtraLossit
refers to the median value of the ratio of extraordinary net income over total assets in year t and in the same
industry as firm i . Ord Loss∗i t realization of the latent value of the firm’s propensity to exhibit negative
ordinary losses in year t . The firm reports ordinary losses if Ord Loss∗i t ≥ 0 and ordinary positive earnings
if Ord Loss∗i t < 0. Latent propensity is explained by a set of control variables, Cash Flow ratio of cash
flow to total lagged assets, Leverage ratio of total debt to total assets, Growth percentage increase in sales,
I nd Ord Lossit ratio of firms reporting ordinary losses to total firms in year t and the same industry as
firm i . To control for endogeneity in auditor’s selection, the model is estimated using a restricted sample
of firms, which hired, at least, one sanctioned auditor in the pre-inspection period and one non-sanctioned
auditor in any year of the sample period. ρ estimated correlation coefficient of both error terms. Z -statistics
are robust to heteroscedasticity
***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively
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In addition, Panel C of Table 6 exhibits the results of the regression of signed dis-
cretionary accruals, both income-increasing (SDA_II) and income-decreasing accruals
(SDA_ID), on the variable that captures the sanction of the auditor (Sanc_Aud). The
results show that the variable of interest is significant only at the 1% level in the income-
decreasing specification for the Big 4 subsample, with a negative sign suggesting that
clients of Big 4 sanctioned auditors disclose significantly lower discretionary accruals
only when engaging in conservative accounting policies.
In sum, the analysis of discretionary accruals leads to inconclusive results regarding
Hypothesis 1. According to univariate tests, UDAs are higher when firms engage a
sanctioned auditor. The effect of disciplinary sanctions vanishes, however, when a
regression analysis is considered. Non-Big 4 sanctioned auditors do not manipulate
accruals, whereas Big 4 auditors seem to specialize in accruals manipulation to deflate
earnings.
6.2 Does audit quality increase after the investigation?
This section provides an empirical evaluation of Hypothesis 2, which focuses on the
efficacy of ICAC sanctions in improvement of audit quality. The sample is restricted
to the financial statements supervised by sanctioned auditors, either before or after
the start date of the disciplinary process. Earnings quality is expected to increase in
the post-inspection period, compared to the pre-inspection period. The results of our
empirical analysis are reported in Tables 7 and 8.
6.2.1 Loss avoidance through extraordinary items
Panels A and B in Table 7 summarize the results concerning our analysis of loss
avoidance when applying a conditional logistic regression, in which the dichotomous
output Loss depends on the partitioning variable, Sanc_Event, which captures the pre-
and post-sanction period and a set of control variables, including firm fixed effects.
The coefficient of variable Sanc_Event is positive and statistically significant for the
whole sample. This result suggests that in the post-inspection period, audited financial
statements exhibit a lower tendency to avoid bottom-line losses through extraordinary
items. When the sample is split into Big 4 and Non-Big 4 auditing firms, the coef-
ficient remains positive, although not statistically significant. Regarding the severity
of the sanction (Low and High), the parameter estimate for the variable Sanc_Event
presents a positive sign and is statistically significant for Low sanctions. Therefore,
this finding suggests, given that audited financial statements show a lower tendency
to avoid bottom-line losses through extraordinary items, that companies audited by
an auditor who has received a low sanction, enhance financial reporting quality in the
post-inspection period.
6.2.2 Discretionary accruals
Table 8 shows the effects of the ICAC’s inspections on the discretionary accruals
reported by clients of sanctioned auditors. Hypothesis 2 is tested considering SDAs and
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UDAs. In turn, SDAs are broken down into income-increasing (II_SDA) and income-
decreasing (ID_SDA) accruals, because auditor’s reaction to ICAC’s inspections may
depend on the nature of the accounting policies established by the firm.
Univariate tests show that discretionary accruals significantly decrease after the
commencement of ICAC’s inspections, although not uniformly across different types
of auditors. Consistent with the empirical evidence reported in the previous section,
only clients of Big 4 auditors exhibit significantly lower discretionary accruals in
the post-inspection period. In the Big 4 auditor’s client subsample, UDAs and SDAs
decrease by 1.3 and 0.8% of total assets, respectively (pvalues < 0.05). As expected,
auditor’s reaction is stronger when inspections end up assessing a fine abovee6000 or
a nonmonetary sanction. When inspections lead to a fine of less than e6000, auditors
restrict only income-increasing accruals. By contrast, when a more severe sanction is
imposed by the ICAC, auditors’ reactions involve both income-increasing and income-
decreasing accruals.
As mentioned, higher earnings quality in the post-inspection period does not nec-
essarily entail an increase in audit quality. Big 4 auditors may engage in better client
selection after the commencement of ICAC’s inspections. To control for this possi-
bility, we regress our different measures of accrual management on the partitioning
variable Sanc_Event and a set of control variables, including firm-fixed effects. Under
the assumption that audit quality actually increases after the beginning of the disci-
plinary process, we expect lower accruals manipulation by pre-existing clients, and,
therefore, the coefficient of Sanc_Event should be negative and statistically signifi-
cant. As is readily apparent from Panels B and C of Table 8, neither in UDA nor in the
SDA specification is the coefficient significant for subsample of Big 4 clients, suggest-
ing that the decrease in abnormal accruals observed in the Big 4-sanctioned auditors’
portfolio is associated with client selection rather than with better audit quality.
6.3 Robustness tests: regions and firm size
To test the robustness of our results, we conducted two sensitivity analyses by partition-
ing the sample according to two criteria: region and firm size. With regard to regions,
one could argue that earnings quality varies across Spanish provinces depending on
their degree of economic and financial development (Monterrey and Sánchez-Segura
2006). Accordingly, we empirically test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using two subsamples of
firms operating in and out of Madrid. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged in
both subsamples after controlling for the different market share of Big 4 and Non-Big
4 auditors in Madrid and the rest of Spain.17
Our second sensitivity analysis deals with the relationship between earnings quality
and firm size. Because the future cash flows of small companies are less predictable
than those of big companies (Dechow and Dichev 2002), earnings quality is expected
to be positively related to client company size. In addition, big clients are expected to
increase disclosure quality because they face increased demand for accounting quality
17 For the sake of brevity, we do not report these results; however, they are available from the authors upon
request.
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by a larger number of stakeholders. To determine if our results hold for different firm
sizes, we empirically test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using two subsamples of firms with total
assets below and above 13.75 millione. Our tests bring mixed results.When using the
likelihood of loss reporting as an indicator of earnings quality, the difference in audit
quality between the sanctioned and the non-sanctioned auditors is higher for small
firms. When using discretionary accruals, however, the difference in audit quality
between the types of auditors increases with the client’s company size.
Finally, following the suggestion of one anonymous reviewer, we conducted the
abnormal accrual analysis including industry fixed effects, and the results, although
not reported, confirm our prior results.
7 Conclusions
In the last decadewe havewitnessed a globalmove toward increased external oversight
of the auditing industry and away from the self-regulatory framework promoted by
professional organizations. In theUSA, the Sarbanes-OxleyAct empowered the Public
Accounting Company Oversight Board with the right to impose sanctions on detected
noncompliance with auditing standards. This enforcement mechanism may also be
found in Canada and in France and some other European countries.
There is little evidence in the literature, however, on the effects of external inves-
tigations and disciplinary sanctions on auditor behavior. In this paper, we analyze
disciplinary actions imposed by the ICAC to see if they prompt changes in audit
quality. In particular, we use two client-specific earnings-quality measures (i.e., the
likelihood of reporting losses through extraordinary items and discretionary accruals),
aimed at capturing different dimensions of audit quality.
To evaluate the ability of sanctions to signal low average audit quality, we computed
our two audit quality measures in a subsample of client companies that hired at least
one sanctioned auditor in the pre-inspection period and one non-sanctioned auditor
in any year of the sample period, 1995–2007. Our results confirm that clients of
Non-Big 4 sanctioned auditors exhibit lower average earnings quality, specifically,
the avoidance of reporting bottom-line losses. The evidence from the discretionary
accruals approach, however, is not conclusive.
Contrary to our expectations, the results are significant only when the auditors were
penalized with lower sanctions. Once more, the evidence from analysis of earnings
management through discretionary accruals is not conclusive.
Among the limitations of ourwork, it is noteworthy thatwehavegroupedfines above
e6000 and nonmonetary sanctions in a single category, because only five engagement
partnerswere penalizedwith temporary suspension. But further evidence on the impact
of nonmonetary sanctions would help to better design the disciplinary system.
Additional tests were conducted using the year of sanction disclosure as a bench-
mark, but we failed to find any statistical difference in the earning’s management
measures used in this study. We concluded, therefore, that auditors’ permissive behav-
ior is modified when the inspection process is initiated and is not associated with
the date of ICAC’s publication. A plausible explanation for this finding may be the
excessive length of the investigation process that allows time for auditors and auditing
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firms to make pre-emptive improvements to their auditing behaviors and audit quality
outcomes.
We must also introduce a caution: Because we lack information about the audit
quality evaluations that fail to find any deficiency, we do not provide any estimation
of bad auditors not identified by the ICAC’s investigations. Other methodologies to
overcome the question related to sample selection, as discussed in Lawrence et al.
(2011), could also trigger different conclusions.
Our period of analysis ends in 2007, the year in which the new General Accounting
Plan adapted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to cover unlisted
companies, but further research covering subsequent periods would demonstrate if the
effectiveness of the disciplinary system in precipitating changes in auditor behavior
has been enhanced or constrained by the major accounting changes triggered by the
adaptation of the IFRS system. This study is also limited to the investigations over
audit engagements, but additional evidence on the efficacy and effectiveness of the
regular inspections that are compelled by the Directive 2006/43/EC would be helpful
for the audit industry and policy makers alike.
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